This paper investigates a purely qualitative version of Savage's theory for decision mak ing under uncertainty. Until now, most rep resentation theorems for preference over acts rely on a numerical representation of util ity and uncertainty where utility and uncer tainty are commensurate. Disrupting the tra dition, we relax this assumption and intro duce a purely ordinal axiom requiring that the Decision Maker (DM) preference between two acts only depends on the relative position of their consequences for each state. Within this qualitative framework, we determine the only possible form of the decision rule and in vestigate some instances compatible with the transitivity of the strict preference.
INTRODUCTION
In the field of decision making under uncertainty, sev eral studies have been carried out to justify the use of this or that decision criterion for the comparison of al ternatives. Each decision criterion is justified by a set of axioms capturing part of the decision behaviour of the DM. Among the most classical studies in this direc tion are the seminal works of Von Neumann and Mor genstern (1947) and Savage (1954) . Such approaches rely on the use of a quantitative criterion for the com parison of alternatives whose justification requires sev eral strong assumptions. For instance, the axiom sys tem usually implies that the subjective value attached to each consequence can be quantified, as well as the likelihood of the possible events. However, in practi cal applications, the elicitation of the information re quired by a quantitative model cannot always be as sessed. This is why some alternative models have been proposed in AI, relying on a more ordinal representa tion of preferences and uncertainty (e.g the qualitative Patrice Perny LIP6 -Paris 6 University 4 Place J ussieu 75252 Paris Cedex 05, France utility proposed by Dubois and Prade (1995) ).
Even if qualitative utility mainly relies on the use of ordinal information (preference order on consequences, relative likelihood of events) it shares a common fea ture with the expected utility criterion: the commen surability of the preference scale and the uncertainty scale used in the model. Recent works in AI propose to escape this assumption in two different ways. The first one is to compare two acts on the basis of their consequences in the most plausible states of the world (Boutilier (1994) ; Tan and Pearl (1994) ; , (1997) ). The other way is to rely on a decision rule that compares the plausibility of the sets of states in which one act has a better consequence than the other (see Dubois et a!. ( 1997) ). This rule has been originally proposed in a possibilitic framework, but could be easily extended to other uncertainty re lations, thus defining other preference models. The aim of the present paper is to provide an unified ax iomatic framework for these kind of rules and to study their ability to describe the DM preferences.
In the next section, we present various quantitative and qualitative models for decision making under un certainty and discuss the necessity of making prefer ence and uncertainty commensurate. In Section 3, an axiomatic framework for purely qualitative preference models is introduced and the structure of qualitative decision rules is characterized. In Section 4 we char acterize the qualitative decision rules compatible with the transitivity of the strict preference. Finally, in Sec tion 5, we discuss some variations of our framework and propose a new family of qualitative decision rules compatible with the transitivity requirement. Notice that in order to save space, all the proofs are omitted.
EXAMPLES AND MOTIVATIONS
Decision Making under uncertainty implies a choice among a set of potential acts (decisions) whose conse quences are not perfectly known. From a formal point of view, such a decision problem is characterized by a set S of states representing the possible situations (or decision contexts), a set X of possible consequences, and a set of acts viewed as elements of X 5 (i.e. an act is a mapping f : S � X where f(s) represents the consequence of act f for any state s E S). In this paper, S and X are supposed to be finite 1 . Thus, if X= {xJ, ... ,xm} and S = {s1, ... ,sn}, an act f E X5 is completely characterized by the vector of consequences (f(si), ... , f(sn)) Denoting � the DM's preference relation over acts, we define the indifference relation � , and a strict prefer ence relation >-by:
f � g and g � f f >-g ¢::;. f � g and not(g � f)
The role of decision analysis is to construct a model of DM's preferences �, including his subjectivity in the evaluation of possible events and consequences of alternatives, so as to be able to use this model to sup port the decision making process. Several preference models have been proposed in this direction, that are all based on a decision rule of the following form:
where X is a comparison function defined from X 2 n to {0, 1} (0 for 'false' and 1 for 'true'). Now we distin guish two types of models corresponding to two differ ent instances of equation (1).
1 PREFERENCE MODELS BASED ON

A VALUE FUNCTION
These models are characterized by the definition of a value function v : X5 � Y where Y is an or dered set and v(f) measures the subjective attrac tiveness of f for the DM. In such models, v(f) = 1/J(f(si), ... , f(sn)) where 1/J is an aggregation function defined from x n to Y. These models are characterized by the following instance of equation ( 1) where 'P is a comparison function defined from Y 2 to {0, 1}. Let us recall some well known examples:
1.1 The Expected Utility
This model is based on a utility function u : X >-+ [0, 1] measuring the subjective attractiveness of any consequence x E X and a probability dis tribution p on S defined by the given of the vec tor (p(s1), ..
• ,p(sn)). In this probabilistic model 
The Qualitative Utilities
The pessimistic qualitative utility (see e.g. Dubois and Prade (1995) ; Dubois et al. (1998) ) is based on a util ity function u : X >-+ [0, 1] measuring the attractive ness of a consequence x E X and a possibility distribution 1r on S defined by the vector (1r(s1), ... , 7r(sn)).
In this model ¢(z1, . .. , zn) = mini=I ... .. n max{l -1r(si)), u(z;)}. This defines the pessimistic criterion v-(f) for any f E X5 by:
This criterion is actually a weighted extension of the Wald criterion and, to some extent, it is "more quali tative" than the standard expected utility.
The optimistic qualitative utility model (see e.g.; Dubois and Prade (1995) ; Dubois, et a! (1998) ) is a variation of the previous model, and as such, it re quires the same utility function and the same pos sibility distribution. This model is characterized by ¢(z1, ... ,zn) = max i=!, ... ,n min{7r(s;), u(z;)} . This defines the optimistic qualitative criterion v+ (f):
Let us underline some implicit assumptions in decision models based on value functions, namely the commen surability between preference and uncertainty, and, for the expected utility model, the cardinality of utilities. Suppose that the DM's preference over X are known and can be represented by the weak-order �P (�P is precisely the order encoded by the utility function). Simllarily, suppose that the subjective likelihood of each event for the DM is known and is described by a binary uncertainty relation �u on 2 5 (e.g. represented by the probability /possibility /necessity measure).
Example 1 Let us consider a decision problem with two states { s1, s2} which are seen as equally plausible by the decision maker (i.e. s1 �u s2 and s2 �u s 1) and a set of consequences X= {x!,X2,xa,x4} such that x1 >-p x2 >-p x3 >-p X4. Let us consider two different utility functions u1 and u 2 that could be used to encode the preference order >-p: In this paper, we denote !IAd2A2, ... , An-d nAn the act whose result is fi(s) if s E At, 'lfi = 1, ... , n, for any partition A1, ... , An-1, A n of the set of states. Consider the acts f = x1 { 81 }x4 { s2} and g = x2 {8!}x3 {82}. Suppose now that we want to use the expected utility model to compare f and g. The prob ability distribution on S must be p(8I) = p( 82) = 0.5. Using function u1 in equation {2) we get the expected values v1 (f) = 0.6, v1 (g) = 0.5. Performing the same operations with u2 yields to v2(!) = 0.4, v2(g) = 0.5. Therefore we get f >--g with u1 and g >--f with u2 .
Hence, when using expected utility, the preference over acts depends on the particular utility function chosen to encode the preference order >--p. This shows that this model exploits an extra information not contained in relations '(,p and ';::: :, u. This is due to the cardinal interpretation of utility grades and to their interlace ment with the probabilities.
In this example, whenever we use a possibility distribu tion 1r to describe our knowledge about the plausibility of events, we have to set: 1r(s1) = 1r (82) relations '(,p and ';::: :, u) is purely ordinal, using qualita tive utility seems more natural than expected utility.
From such an example, we could infer that this ordinal model is purely qualitative. However, things are less elementary, as shown in the following example.
Example 2 Suppose now that s1 >--u 82 in example 1 and consider the following utility functions:
We want now to compare the acts f and g on the ba sis of the pessimistic qualitative utility model. Let us choose an arbitrary possibility distribution on S to rep resent the likelihood weak-order on ';::: :, u, e.g 1r(81) = 1 and 1r(82) = 0.5. Hence, using function u1 in equa tion (3) we get the expected values v] (f) "' 0.4, vj(g) = 0.3. Performing the same operations with function u2 yields to v;;(f) == 0.6, v;;(g) "'0.7. There fore we get f >--g with v] and g >--f with v;;.
This example shows that models based on qualita tive utility also exploit an extra information not con tained in relations '(,p and ';::: :, u, namely their interlace ment. Indeed, in such models, utility and possibility are commensurate and represented on a common or dinal scale PU. On this scale, the use of function u1 yields to the following order: 8I >--PU 82 >--PU XI >--PU x2 >--PU X3 >--PU X4 whereas function u2 yields to: 81 ?-PU XI ?-PU X2 ?-PU X 3 )--PU X 4 ?-PU 82. This explains the difference of result. Constructing relation >--PU from >--u and >--p requires additional information which must be elicited by questioning the DM. In the following Section, we introduce simple models avoiding the definition of relation ';:: Pu.
PREFERENCE MODELS BASED ON PAIRWISE COMPARISONS
We consider here models characterized by the following general instance of equation ( 1).
where <p and <p 1 are comparison functions and 1/! is an aggregation function. When the preferences over X are represented by the weak-order '(,p we can choose:
Now, if we assume that the subjective likelihood of each event for the DM are described by a binary un certainty relation ';::: :, u on 2 5 , then for any pair of events A, B seen as elements of 2 5 and characterized by vec tors (a I, .. . , an) and (b1, ... , b n) respectively, we can define function 1/J so as to satisfy the condition:
This yields to the following general decision rule:
where (8)}. This general Lifting Rule , proposed by Dubois and a!. (1997) , can be seen as the counterpart of majority rules in social choice theory (see e.g Bordes (1983) ).
The Probabilistic Lifting rule , can be represented by a function 1/J defined by:
where p is a probability distribution on S.
The Necessity Lifting rule, corresponds to : 1/J(ai, .. . , an)= min (1-1r(sj))
where 1r is a possibility distribution on S. Finally, notice that the preference inversions observed in example 1 and 2 cannot occur when using lifting rules because, by definition, the preference over acts only depends on relations >;.:,u and >;.:,p. In this respect, preference models based on a lifting rule can be seen as purely qualitative models.
3
A QUALITATIVE VERSION OF SAVAGE's FRAMEWORK
This Section aims at providing an axiomatic frame work for qualitative preference models and to derive representation theorems for purely qualitative prefer ences. Following Savage we start from a user-driven preference relation over acts, and define axioms that this preference relation should satisfy to be a quali tative and "rational" model. Under such axioms, it is possible to construct a preference relation >;.:,p on the consequences, a likelihood relation >;.:,£ on events, and a decision rule based on these two relations that perfectly describes the DMs preferences. Let us first recall a part of the axioms proposed by Savage (1954) to characterize the expected utility model (2). Such an axiom in Savage's work is justified by the goal assigned to the theory. If acts are ranked according to expected utility then the preference over acts will be transitive, reflexive, and complete. In this paper, we do not want to require such a property a priori: the DM Preferences could be rational without being complete nor transitive (see Section 4). Now, let A � S be an event, f and g two acts, and denote by fAg the act such that:
fAg is short for fAgA where A is the complement of A. Savage has proposed the sure-thing principle axiom, that requires that the preference between two acts fAh and gAh does not depend on the choice of h:
Axiom S2 (Sure-thing principle).
VA � S, V J, g, h, h' E X 5, ( / Ah >;.:, gAh '¢:=} fAh ' >;.:, gAh') Definition 1 (C onditional Preference) f is said to be weakly preferred to g, conditioned on A iff if Vh E X5,fAh >;.:, gAh. This is denoted by (J >;.:, g)A.
Definition 2 (Null events) An event A is said to be null if and only if: V J, g, h E X5 : f Ah � gAh.
Any event A � S unable to make a discrimination for at least one pair of acts is considered as null (e.g irrelevant for the DM). Note that this definition of null events is also consistent when >;.:, is not complete.
Among acts in X 5 there are constant acts such that: :Jx EX : Vs E S, f(s) == x. Such an act will be denoted f x. It seems reasonable to identify the set of constant acts { f x, x E X} and X. The D M preference relation >;.:,p on X can be induced from (X5,>;.:,) as follows:
Vx, y E X, (x >;.:,p y '¢:=} fx >;.:, j y )
Another hypothesis is that the preference order on con sequences is unique and does not depend on the events considered. This is the third Savage postulate:
Axiom S3. VA � S,A not null, Ux >;.:, jy)A '¢:=} X >;.:,p y.
The preference on acts also induces a likelihood rela tion among events: it is sufficient to consider the set of binary acts, of the form fxAfy, which thanks to (S3) can be denoted x Ay, where x >-p y. Clearly for fixed x >-p y, the set of acts { x, y} 5 is isomorphic to the set of events 2 5 . Since the restrictions of (X5, >;.:,) to { x, y} 5 may be inconsistent with the restriction to { x ' , y'} 5 for other choices of consequences x ' , y' such that x' >-p y', Savage has introduced a new postulate:
Axiom S4. VA,B � S, Vx,y, x',y' EX: x ?-p y and x' >-p y', xAy >;.:, xBy '¢:=} x' Ay' >;.:, x' By'. Under S4, the choice of x,y EX with x >-P y is not important when defining the ordering between events in terms of binary acts. Hence, the following likelihood relation on events can be derived from >;.:,:
A >;.:,L B {o} (:Jx, y E X : x >-p y and xAy >;.:, xBy) (7)
Lastly, Savage has assumed that the weakly ordered set (X, >;.:,P) is not trivial:
X contains at least two elements x, y such that fx >-f y (or x >-p y).
Under S1-S5, the likelihood relation>;.:,£ on events is a comparative probability ordering (be S finite or not).
Finally, Savage introduces last postulates that enable him to derive the existence (and uniqueness) of a nu merical probability measure on 5 that can represent the likelihood relation;:;£. However, these axioms are omitted in the present paper because they are irrele vant for a finite set of states and for qualitative models.
2 THE QUALI TATIVE INDEPENDENCE
We propose now a new axiom aiming at specifying the qualitative nature of a preference model. This ax iom is an independence axiom that can be seen as the counterpart of an independence condition used in so cial choice theory (see Sen (1986) ), completed with a neutrality condition making preferences independent of the labels of the acts considered. We call this ax iom Qualitative Independence: This result provides a useful characterization of the lifting rule that can be used to justify this model in a practical situation. If QI is accepted as a norm for qualitative models, then the only available decision rules are lifting rules. This result holds even if;:; is not supposed to be complete, and thus concerns a wider class of lifting rules than those given in paragraph 2.3 and in Dubois et a!. (1997) . Under Ql, we get nice unanimity properties: whenever f is as least as good g for all possible states, f must be preferred to g:
If ;:; satisfies 53, 55 and QI then 'lf,g E X5, ('is E 5,j(s) 'rp g(s)) ===> f >-g Vf ,g E X5,(Vs E 5,f(s) ;:;P g(s)) ===> f ;:; g Moreover, if ;:; is complete then we get: 'ij,g E X5, ((('is E 5, f(s) ;:;P g(s)) and (3s E S,s not null and f(s) 'rp g(s))) ===> f >-g)
4
THE TRA NSITIVITY OF STRICT PREFERENCE
The transitivity of preference resulting from a qualita tive decision rule is not obvious. This can be simply observed using the following example:
Example 3 Suppose S = { s1, s2, s3} with probabil ities p(si) = p(s2) = p(s3) = 1/3. Consider 3 consequences x, y, z E X such that x >-p y >-p z. Using the probabilistic lifting to compare the acts f = x{s1}y{s2}z{s3},g = y{s1}z{s2}x{s3} and h = z{st}x{s2}y{s3} we get [f ;: g] = { s 1, s 2 }, [g ;: h ] = {s1,s3} and [ h ;:; f ] = {s2,s3}) and there fore f >-g, g >-h and h >-f, i.e. an intransitive cycle. On the contrary if probabilities of states are p'(s1) = 0.6, p'(s2) = 0.3 and p'(s3) = 0.1 we get f >-g, g >-h and f >-h, a complete order.
This example is actually derived from a Condorcet ef fect as those observed in Social choice (see e.g Sen, 1986) From a descriptive point of view, example 3 shows the ability of qualitative decision rules to explain some cyclic preference structures and this is a really original point when compared to more classical models based on value functions. However, from a prescriptive point of view, the possibility of getting cyclic preferences is an important source of difficulty. For this reason, we investigate in this Section the possibility for qualita tive models to fulfill some minimal transitivity require ments. To this end, we must introduce new definitions concerning the decisiveness of events.
4.1
DECISIVE EVENTS
In example 3, considering the probability distribution p ' , it is easy to show that f >-p g holds as soon as f(sJ) >-p g(sJ) and thus, s2 and s3 are negligible with respect to s1. { s1} is said to be a decisive state: In example 3, the transitivity is obtained using a very special structure: { s1} is a decisive state, { s2} is a de cisive state in { s2, s3} and this yields to the following hierarchy of decisive events {s!} >-L {s2,s3} >-L {s2} >-L { s3} which corresponds to a lexicographic prefer ence structure (see Fishburn, 1975) . A weakening of decisiveness for states is defined by:
Definition 4 For any subsetS' <;; 8, the state s' E 8' is said to be a vetoer in 8' iff:
A vetoer in 8 is simply c alled a vetoer.
Definition 5 For any subsetS' <;; S, an event A <;; 8' is said to be predominant in 8' iff it is decisive in 8' and contains only vetoer-states in 8'. A predominant event in S is simply called a predominant event.
4.2
MODELS COMPATIBLE WITH QUASI-TRANSITIVE PREFERENCES
We consider here a very general framework where pref erences are not supposed to be transitive nor complete.
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We only assume the quasi-transitivity of (,, e.g. the transitivity of its asymmetric part >-. This weak re quirement allows a wide class of preference models to be concerned, including those with an intransitive in difference (semi-orders, interval orders, see e.g Pirlot and Vincke (1997) ) and those allowing incomparabil ity (see e.g. Roy, (1996) ) . We require only the total comparability of constants acts (i.e. the completness of (,p) which is a natural property because there is no conflict between states in the comparison of constant acts. Hence we consider the following axiom that can be seen as a useful weakening of S 1.
Axiom AI. (, is reflexive and quasi-transitive, and its restriction to constant acts is complete.
Moreover, as far as transitivity properties are con cerned, we need to consider at least three distinct levels on X and strengthen axiom S5 with the following: Axiom A5. X contains at least three consequences x, y and z such that fx >-fy >-f z .
Then we establish the two following technical lemmas:
Lemma 1 I f(, satisfies Al, AS, 83, and Q I then the following property holds for any non-empty subset A of 8: Hence we get the following theorem: In other terms, when the DM preferences are quasi transitive and compatible with QI, they necessarily rely on a knowledge structure admitting a predomi nant event 0 which makes negligible any other disjoint event. Indeed f >-g holds as soon as f is preferred to g for all states belonging to 0. Moreover, whenever two states s and s' are conflicting within 0 concerning a pair f,g (i.e. f(s) ?-p g(s) and g(s') ?-p f(s')), no strict preference can be stated between the two acts. In Social Choice Theory, such a preference structure is said to be oligarchic (see e.g. Sen (1986) ). The larger is 0, the less decisive the procedure. In case of to tal ignorance, i.e. when no state of the world is more likely than another, we get 0 = 8: the preference re lation (, reduces to the functional dominance on X 5 .
In the other extreme case, 0 contains a single state, the DM preferences can be described by a" dictatorial" decision rule due to the existence of a decisive state s. Such a rule can emerge when the DM is almost certain than the "true state" is s and that the other states are negligible: all the other possible futures are ignored. More precisely, we can derive the following result:
Corollary 2 If axioms Al, AS, S3,and QI hold, there exists a unique maximaP partition of S into events 01 ' ... 'ok' k > 1 such that 0 1 is predominant and Vj: 2::; j < k, event Oj is predominant in S\U{;;; i 0; thus yielding to a hierarchy of predominant events.
This result is well illustrated by possibilistic and neces sity lifting rules for which A1, A5, S3 and QI hold. The possibilistic lifting corresponds to the case where only one predominant event 0 1 exists. It is simply defined by the core of the distribution, e.g the set of states hav ing a maximal possibility: 01 = {s E S : 7r (s) = 1}. The necessity lifting rule corresponds to the case with possibly several levels in the hierarchy, i.e. one for each distinct level-cut of the distribution 7r on S. Now, assuming both completeness and transitivity of � we obtain a hierarchy of predominant states:
Theorem 2 For any preference relation among acts that satisfies Sl, 83, AS and QI, we have, for all pairs / , g E xs
This theorem shows the lexicographic structure of pref erence and can be seen as a counterpart of Fishburn's theorem obtained in the context of multicriteria anal ysis (see Fishburn, 1975) . It demonstrates a phe nomenon which was already illustrated in example 3 and also explains that comparative probabilities (and not only classical probabilities) are incompatible with a qualitative approach of decision. The resulting lexi cographic rule corresponds to a very particular struc ture of uncertainty in which all the non impossible states must be linearly ordered. As a consequence, this forbids the description of total ignorance (where the states are equally plausible). Moreover, there ex ists a predominant state s*, more plausible that any other state, and even more plausible than the event S \ { s*}. As soon as s* gives a better consequence for an act than for another one, the first act is preferred. The other possible states of the world are negligible compared to s* and only considered when the domi nant state does not allow the discrimination between the acts. The decision is then based on the next plau sible state .. . 
CONCLUSIONS
The results obtained in Section 4 are rather negative since they underline the poor descriptive ability of models satisfying both QI and the quasi-transitivity of preferences. For this reason, we have investigated possible weakening of our initial axiomatic framework.
A first idea is relaxing axiom S3, arguing that the pref erence order on consequences may actually depend on the state of the world considered. However, using S2 we can soundly3 define, for each state Sj E S, a pref erence relation �j on X by setting:
'V x,y E X, X � P; Y ¢=? Ux � /y){s;)
Hence, from each relation �P; we can define a prefer ence relation �j on X s by setting:
Thus, under QI, linking relation � to the profile (� 1 , ... , �n) is still an ordinal aggregation problem with similar difficulties (see Sen(1986) ). Thus, cancelling S3 does not really provide new possibilities.
A second possibility is to relax partially the quasi transitivity of � on X8. In practical applications, most of the acts in X s are purely imaginary and per haps not even feasible. Hence, one can be tempted to require quasi-transitivity only on feasible acts. How ever, using example 3, we could show that this does not provide new possibilities as long as there exists a feasible subset of acts X'8 ' where X' � X contains at least 3 distinct elements and S' c;; S contains at least 3 non-null states. We could also consider a relaxation of quasi-transitivity for acyclicity, i.e., If f0, ... , fk E X8, ((Vi = 1, .. . , k, fi-1 >-/;) => not(fk >-fo)). In deed, acyclicity is sufficient to soundly define a choice function selecting the best elements among any non empty subset of X8:
However, we have also investigated this relaxation and proved that qualitative decision models compatible with acyclicity have also very special features. For example, they necessarily provide some state with an absolute veto, thus limiting the role of other states.
The last possibility is to relax axiom QI which turns out to be a very demanding condition. If we are in terested in developing a purely ordinal framework for decision under uncertainty, the most natural weaken ing of QI is to cancel the "independence" side of the 382 can be seen as an independence condition allowing to derive one-dimensional preference relations from �-For more details see e.g. Fishburn and Wakker (1995) condition while keeping the "ordinal" side. A good so lution for this is to assume that the preference f ;:; g not only depends on preferences f(s) ;:;P g(s), for all s, but also on preferences of type f (s) ;:;P h(s), g(s) ;:;P h(s) , h ( s) ;:;P f(s) , h(s) ;:;P f (s) for some h in X5. This solution has been proposed in the frame work of multicriteria Decision Making so as to over come difficulties due to Arrow-like theorems (see e. g. Ferny 1992, Bouyssou and Ferny 1992) . In the frame work of qualitative decision theory, it should be useful to follow the same path and to investigate non-binary preferences. As a first set of examples, consider the following relations: These relations must be regarded as natural quali tative counterparts of the so-called stochastic domi nance relation used in decision under probabilistic un certainty (see Levy (1992) for a survey on this topic).
Clearly, all these relations are transitive but not nec essarily complete. When ;:; is constructed from one of these rules, unanimity holds but not the QI axiom and the theorems of this paper do not apply. These examples open new perspectives for designing purely qualitative preference models without QI. This is left for further investigation.
Further work also includes a parallel Savage-like ax iomatic study of models based on the comparison of the consequences of the acts in the most plausible states (see (Boutilier 1994; Tan and Pearl 1994; Braf man and Te nnenholtz 1996, 1997) ). These models do not require preference over consequences and uncer tainty to be commensurate and do not obey the QI requirement, but the associated decision rules, when they are explicit, also focus on a decisive set of states: the set of most plausible states. Our approach may also be compatible with generalized qualitative prob abilites (Lehman (1996) ), that are incomplete orders of uncertainty and that require both the transitivity of the indifference relation and unanimity properties stronger than ours. Moreover, generalized qualitative probabilities encompass a notion of neglectibility be tween events whose links with our notion of decisive ness should be studied.
